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Abstract
A large experimental and empirical literature on asymmetric dominance and attraction
effects shows that the probability that an alternative is chosen can increase if additional
alternatives become available. Hence context matters and choices and, therefore, market
shares can not be accurately described by standard choice models where individuals choose
the alternative that yields the highest utility. This paper analyzes a simple procedural
choice model. Individuals determine their choice by a sequence of binary comparisons.
The model offers an intuitive explanation for violations of regularity such as the attraction
and the asymmetric dominance effect and shows their relation to the similarity effect. The
model analyzes a new rationale why context matters. The model is applied to explain
primacy and recency effects and to derive implications with respect to product design.
Keywords: asymmetric dominance, attraction effect, similarity effect, binary choice,
primacy effect, recency effect, regularity
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1. Introduction
A central question for sales managers and marketing experts is how customers choose among
several alternatives. This is crucial in order to predict market shares and especially to predict
how market shares change if new products are introduced or old ones are withdrawn from the
market. The most fundamental assumption with respect to choice among several alternatives
is regularity. Regularity requires that the probability that an alternative is chosen does not
increase if the choice set is expanded. Formally: Let t be some alternative that is an element
of choice sets A and B. If B is a subset of A, then the probability that t is chosen from B
must not be less than the probability that t is chosen from A: Pr{t|B} ≥ Pr{t|A}. Regularity
is arguably the weakest and intuitively most plausible rationality condition suggested in the
literature. Furthermore, regularity is a minimal requirement of nearly all theories of choice.
A growing body of literature documents that context effects exist and specifically that
choice patterns systematically violate regularity. Violations of regularity were first documented
by Huber et al. (1982). They investigate how the introduction of a new product affects the
choice probabilities (i.e., the market shares) of existing products. The original choice set
contains two alternatives. The expanded choice set contains additionally an alternative that
is dominated by one of the alternatives in the original choice set. Huber et al. find that
the probability that the dominating alternative is chosen is larger for the expanded choice set
than for the original set. The literature refers to this violation of regularity as asymmetric
dominance effect.
Following Huber et al. (1982), numerous studies of consumer choice have documented how
asymmetric dominance effects lead to violations of regularity (e.g., Ranteshwar, Shocker and
Stewart (1987), Kardes et al. (1989), Simonson and Tversky (1992), Lehman and Pan (1994),
Doyle et al. (1999), and Dhar and Simonson (2003)). Violations of regularity are not limited
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to consumer products but appear to be a general pattern of choice situations. For example,
asymmetric dominance effects have been documented in choice among political candidates in
U.S. elections (Pan et al. 1995), job candidates (Highhouse 1996), policy issues (Herne 1997),
lotteries (Herne 1999), and strategies in static games with complete information (Amaldoss et
al. 2005). Shafir, Waite and Smith (2002) and Hurly (2003) examine the behavior of two kinds
of birds and find that these birds violate regularity when choosing among feeding places.
Violations of regularity also occur if an alternative is added that is not dominated by one of
alternatives in the original choice set (e.g., Simonson and Tversky 1992, Huber and Puto 1983).
In these papers, the alternative that is added to the choice set is similar in terms of attributes
to one of the original alternatives (the ’target’). While the new alternative is not dominated,
it is clearly inferior to the target. These studies find that the probability that the target is
chosen is larger for the expanded choice set than for the original choice set. To distinguish the
effects of dominated and non-dominated alternatives, we use the term ’attraction effect’ only
for the observation that the probability that the target is chosen increases if a non-dominated
alternative is added to the choice set.
In the literature, alternatives are described as vector of attributes. Explanations of asym-
metric dominance and attraction effects can be broadly grouped into two classes. The first
proposes that context matters because an expansion of the choice set changes how individuals
perceive and weight the attributes of the alternatives. Depending on its design, the addition
of an asymmetrically dominated alternative can stretch the range of the attribute where the
dominant alternative is weaker than the competitor. According to the range effect, this reduces
the experienced difference between the dominant alternative and the competitor and thereby
makes the dominant alternative more attractive (e.g., Huber et al. 1982; Huber and Puto,
1983). According to the frequency effect, an increase of the number of alternatives which are
inferior to the dominant alternative along some attribute, increases the weight that is placed
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on this attribute. These explanations describe individuals as comparing alternatives attribute
by attribute. Differences in the strength of attributes are aggregated and then determine which
alternative is chosen. The second class of explanations considers heuristic strategies in decision
making. For example, Simonson (1989) argues that individuals, who perceive that they have
to justify their decision, are more likely to choose the dominant alternative since this is easy to
justify. The ’Majority of Confirming Dimensions’ hypothesis proposes that individuals com-
pare the strength of alternatives along each attribute and choose the alternative that compares
most favorable for the largest number of attributes. These theories can explain the asymmet-
ric dominance and attraction effect but they do not provide formal models which generate
quantitative predictions about choice probabilities (one exception is Tversky and Simonson
1993).
We develop a simple procedural model of choice to generate quantitative predictions about
choice probabilities (e.g., market shares). We consider individuals who determine their choice
by a sequence of comparisons between the available alternatives. Consider an individual who
has to choose one out of three available alternatives. The individual starts by comparing two
alternatives. Then she discards the alternative that is not preferred and compares the preferred
alternative to the third alternative and chooses whichever she prefers.
This approach has several advantages:
1) The model predicts choice patterns and especially how choices change if alternatives are
added or removed from the choice set. Additionally, the model offers a simple and straightfor-
ward explanation for asymmetric dominance, attraction, and similarity effects.
2) Choices are determined by binary choice probabilities which can be easily observed.
Since alternatives do not need to be describable as vector of attributes, the model can applied
if the strenght of an attribute can not be measured (e.g., design).
3) The model does not get more complex if the number of attributes increases which is
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important for applications where the number of product attributes is usually large.
Our model is a procedural choice model where individuals split the decision problem into
a sequence of binary comparisons. This approach is similar to Blavatskyy and Köhler (2007)
who model the pricing of a lottery as a sequence of binary comparisons between the lottery
and monetary amounts. The model shows that violations of regularity such as the asymmetric
dominance and the attraction effect can be explained by a simple and intuitive model where
individuals compare alternatives to determine their choice. Additionally, we highlight a new
rationale why the context of a choice situation matters. New alternatives affect choices simply
because they are compared to the other alternatives.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and relates the predictions
of the model to the findings in the literature on asymmetric dominance, symmetric dominance,
and attraction effects and shows the relation between attraction effect and the countervailing
similarity effect. Section 3 discusses a more elaborate choice rule that improves the quality
of the decision. Section 4 discusses implications for marketing and product design. Section 5
concludes.
2. Binary comparisons and choice
2.1. The Model
Let S be a choice set that contains 2 ≤ n <∞ alternatives. Let Sr be the set of all alternatives
that are in S and that have not been compared to another alternative. If a subject has to
choose one alternative from S, she uses the following procedure P :
Procedure P:
Step 1: Draw two alternatives i, j ∈ S at random and compare i and j.
Step 2: Draw a new alternative at random from Sr and compare it to the alternative that was
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preferred in the last comparison.
Step 3: Repeat step 2. The sequence of binary comparisons stops when Sr = ∅.
Step 4: Choose the alternative that is preferred in the last comparison.
There is plenty of evidence that choices are probabilistic. For example, Hey and Orme
(1994) and Ballinger and Wilcox (1997) report that 25% and 20.8% of decisions in binary
choice tasks are reversed if subjects face the same decision problem for a second time. To take
the probabilistic nature of choice into account, we assume that subjects are characterized by
binary choice probabilities. For any i, j ∈ S exists pi,j with 0 ≤ pi,j ≤ 1 and pj,i = 1 − pi,j
where pi,j is the probability that i is preferred over j in a binary comparison.
Procedure P determines for each i ∈ S the probability Pr{i|S} that the alternative is
chosen with
P
i∈S Pr{i|S} = 1. The probability that an alternative is chosen is a function
of the binary choice probabilities and is increasing in the probability that the alternative is
preferred in a binary comparison. If S = {i, j}, the subject chooses i with probability pi,j
and j with probability 1 − pi,j . Since Pr{i|S} gets increasingly complex as n gets large, it
is convenient to define choice probabilities recursively. Given choice set S with j ∈ S, let
S−j = {x ∈ S|x 6= j}.
Proposition 1: Pr{i|S} = 1n
P
j 6=i pij (Pr{i|S−j}+Pr{j|S−i}).
Most of the literature on asymmetrice dominance and attraction effects investigates choice
sets with three alternatives since this is the simplest case where violations of regularity can
occur. For the remainder of the paper, we restrict attention to choice sets with three or less
alternatives. Consider a subject that chooses one alternative from the set {i, j, k} and let
Pr{i|i, j, k} denote the probability that i is chosen.
Corollary 1: Pr{i|i, j, k} = 23pi,jpi,k + 13 [pi,jpj,k + pi,k(1− pj,k)].
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The model differs in two respects from standard choice theory: it takes into account that
choices are probabilistic and it models choice as result of a sequence of binary comparisons.
One advantage of the model is that predictions in the limit coincide with the predictions from
standard choice theory. Specifically, if all binary choice probabilities converge to either zero
or one and if the limit can be represented by a transitive preference relation ÂP , then in the
limit the choice pattern under procedure P is deterministic and the same as predicted by ÂP .
2.2. Asymmetric Dominance
The literature on asymmetric dominance and attraction effects defines alternatives by the
strength of their attributes. An alternative dominates another alternative if it is superior
or equal along all attributes and strictly superior along at least one attribute. Experimental
studies have used different kinds of attributes, including price, physical product characteristics,
and quality ratings. Most studies limit themselves to alternatives that are defined by two
attributes. Figure 1 shows a typical setup in an experiment. The original choice set contains
alternatives t and c. Alternative t is the target, i.e., the alternative whose probability to be
chosen is of interest, and alternative c is the competitor. The expanded choice set contains an
additional alternative which is usually called the ’decoy’. Studies of the asymmetric dominance
effect consider an asymmetrically dominated decoy d such that d is dominated by the target t
but not by the competitor c. Alternatives that lie in the dark shaded area are dominated by t.
Alternatives that lie in the light shaded area are dominated by t and by c. Alternative z is not
dominated by any of the other alternatives. The literature refers to z as ’relatively inferior’
with respect to the target t since z is clearly worse than the target along attribute 1 and only
slightly better along attribute 2.
(insert figure 1 here)
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In our model, choices are determined by binary choice probabilities and not by the strength
of attributes. To relate the predictions of our model to the observations in the literature we
need one assumption on how the strength of attributes affects binary choice probabilities.
We assume that in a binary comparison, an alternative is preferred with probability one if
and only if it dominates the other alternative. The intuition behind the assumption is the
following: Alternatives are usually presented as vector of two attributes. Hence dominance
is obvious and, therefore, it is unlikely that an individual chooses the dominated alternative.
If no alternative dominates the other, then there exists a trade-off in the sense that there
exists at least one attribute where one alternative is superior and one attribute where the
other alternative is superior. Hence, the preferred alternative depends on how important one
attribute is compared to other attributes. In terms of the model, this implies that pd,t = 0 and
that 0 < pc,d < 1 and 0 < pt,c < 1.
The literature on asymmetric dominance analyzes choice patterns if a decoy d is added to
the choice set that is dominated by the target alternative t but not by the other alternative c
(i.e., pd,t = 0 and 0 < pc,d < 1). The literature offers strong and compelling evidence that the
addition of the asymmetrically dominated decoy d leads to an increase in the probability that
the dominant alternative t is chosen.
Corollary 2: Let pt,c, pc,d < 1. If pd,t = 0, then Pr{t|c, t, d} > Pr{t|c, t}.
Corollary 2 shows that whenever an asymmetrically dominated alternative is added to the
choice set, the probability increases that the dominant alternative is chosen.
The reason for the asymmetric dominance effect is that with positive probability t is com-
pared to d instead of c. If t is part of the first comparison, adding d to the choice set has no
effect on the probability that t is chosen. The target t is chosen if it is preferred over c (which
happens with probability pt,c) and preferred over d (which happens with probability one). The
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difference occurs when the first comparison is between c and d. If c is chosen over d, the
situation is the same as if there are only c and t in the choice set. But with probability 1−pc,d,
alternative d is chosen over c. In this case, t is chosen with probability one instead of being
chosen with probability pt,d. The difference between the probabilities that t is chosen is equal
to 13(1− pc,d) (1− pt,c). The first term
1
3(1− pc,d) is the probability that the first comparison
is between c and d and that d is chosen over c. The second term is the difference between the
probabilities that t is chosen if compared to d and c, respectively. While obviously dominated
alternatives are not chosen in binary choice problems (i.e., pd,t = 0), from Corollary 1 follows
that the asymmetrically dominated decoy d is chosen with small positive probability if there
are three alternatives. In fact, in experiments between 1% and 4% of the subjects choose the
asymmetrically dominated alternative.
Note that Corollary 2 does not hold if the expanded choice sets contains more than three
alternatives. If there are more than three alternatives, the probability that the asymmetrically
dominant alternative is chosen can increase or decrease.
2.3. Symmetric Dominance
While there exists a large literature on the effect of asymmetrically dominated alternatives,
little research has been done on the effects of symmetrically dominated alternatives. An alter-
native is symmetrically dominated if it is dominated by all other alternatives (e.g., alternative
s in fig.1). Recall that we assume that subjects never choose a dominated alternative in a bi-
nary choice problem. Our model predicts that an additional alternative does not affect choice
probabilities if it is dominated by both alternatives in the original choice set.
Corollary 3: Let 0 < pt,c < 1. Pr{t|c, t, s} = Pr{t|c, t} and Pr{c|c, t, s} = Pr{c|c, t} if and
only if ps,t = ps,c = 0.
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Corollary 3 shows that a new alternative affects the choice probabilities unless the new
alternative is dominated by both alternatives in the original choice set. From Corollary 1 and
Corollary 3 follows that a new alternative only affects choice probabilities if it chosen with
positive probability. In terms of attributes, Corollary 3 implies that the strength of attributes
of the dominated alternative does not matter as long as the alternative is dominated by both
alternatives in the original choice set. Unlike our model, other theories that propose that decoy
effects arise from attributewise comparisons predict that the strength of the attributes of the
dominated alternative matters even if the alternative is dominated by both alternatives in the
original choice set. To test different choice models, Wedell (1991, Experiment 2 and 3) uses
two types of decoys which are dominated by both alternatives in the original choice set. Decoys
are either dominated by t for both attributes and by c for one attribute (i.e., one attribute
is as strong as in c) or dominated by c for both attributes and by t for one attribute (i.e.,
one attribute is as strong as in t). Wedell finds that the type of the decoy has no effect on
the probabilities that t or c are chosen. Hence asymmetrically dominated decoys are sufficient
to increase the probability that the dominant alternative is chosen (as predicted by Corollary
2) but decoys that are dominated by both alternatives have no effect on choice probabilities
(as predicted by Corollary 3). Wedell concludes that models where decoy effects arise from
attributewise comparisons can not explain the results if a symmetrically dominated alternative
is added to the choice set.
As benchmark, we assumed above that the probability that an alternative is part of the
first comparison is the same for each alternative. We discuss in section 4 why firms have an
incentive to manipulate the order of comparisons and which strategies can be used to achieve
this goal. The predictions about the asymmetric and symmetric dominance effects continue to
hold if the probability to be part of the first comparison differs across alternatives. Formally:
Corollary 2 and 3 continue to hold if each binary combination of alternatives has positive
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probability to be compared in the first comparison.
2.4. Non-dominated decoys and the Attraction Effect
In the real world, non-dominated alternatives are more important than dominated ones because
in reality, products have many attributes, and it is rare that one product dominates another
in the sense that it is superior along all attributes. A number of papers (e.g., Simonson and
Tversky 1992, Huber and Puto 1983) investigate what happens if an alternative is added to
the choice set that is not dominated by one of the original alternatives. These studies design
an alternative z such that z is more similar in terms of attributes to t than to c and such that
the trade-off between t and z is in same direction as the trade-off between c and t (see fig. 1).
While z is not dominated, it is unattractive compared to t since z is clearly worse than t along
attribute 1 and only slightly better along attribute 2.
Huber and Puto (1983) were the first who demonstrated the attraction effect. They showed
that the probability that an alternative is chosen can increase if a non-dominated alternative
is added to the choice set. Subsequently, a large number of studies have documented huge
effects of non-dominated alternatives (e.g., Ratneshwar et al. 1987, Simonson 1989, Simonson
and Tversky 1992, etc.). However, the increase in the probability that the target t is chosen is
smaller than if an asymmetrically dominated alternative is added.
Our model explains these results and provides necessary and sufficient conditions under
which the attraction effect occurs. Additionally, it shows that the asymmetric dominance
effect is just a special case of the attraction effect.
Corollary 4: Let pt,c, pz,c, pt,z ∈ (0, 1). Then Pr{t|c, t, z} > Pr{t|c, t} if and only if pt,zpz,c2(1−pt,z)+pz,c > pt,c.
Corollary 4 shows that the probabilty that the target is chosen can increase even if a non-
dominated alternative is added to the choice set. Recall that we assume that a dominated
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alternative is never preferred in a binary comparison (i.e., iff t dominates z, then pt,z = 1).
The term pt,zpz,c2(1−pt,z)+pz,c is increasing in pt,z. In the limit as pt,z → 1, the condition in Corollary
4 is satisfied for all pt,c < 1. Hence the asymmetric dominance effect is just a special case of
the attraction effect. Proposition 1 immediately implies that the probability that the target
is chosen is strictly increasing in the probability that the target is preferred over z or c. Since
the tradeoff between attributes is much worse between t and z than the tradeoff between t
and c, one would expect that the probability that t is preferred over z is large relative to the
probability that t is preferred over c. Corollary 4 shows that a violation of regularity (i.e., the
attraction effect) is observed if it is relatively likely that the target is preferred over z compared
to the likelihood that the target is preferred over c.
2.5. Attraction Effect versus Similarity Effect
In studies on the attraction effect, the new alternative z is similar to t in terms of attributes.
The fact that the probability that t is chosen increases if a non-dominated alternative z is added
to the choice set is even more surprising than the asymmetric dominance effect because the
similarity effect predicts the opposite. The similarity effect refers to the observation that a new
alternative takes disproportionately more share from similar alternatives than from dissimilar
ones. One explanation for the similarity effect is that similar alternatives are closer substitutes.
Hence the similarity effect predicts that the probability that t is chosen decreases more than
the probability that c is chosen.
If a new alternative is added to the choice set, then the probability that t is chosen increases
if the similarity effect is weaker than the attraction effect. Our model allows to separate the
contributions of the similarity and attraction effect on choice probabilities. Note that
Pr{t|c, t, z}− Pr{t|c, t} = 2
3
pt,c (pt,z − 1) +
1
3
pz,c (pt,z − pt,c) (1)
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The first term on the RHS of eqn.1 measures the size of the similarity effect. If pt,z < 1, some
consumers choose z instead of t. Hence the similarity effect decreases the probability that t is
chosen. If t dominates z (i.e., if pt,z = 1), the similarity effect vanishes. The second term on
the RHS of eqn.1 measures the size of the attraction effect. The new alternative z increases
the probability that t is chosen if the subject first compares z with c and prefers z (which
happens with probability 13pz,c) and if t is more likely to be preferred in a binary comparison
with z than in a binary comparison with c (i.e., if pt,z > pt,c). Hence, a necessary condition
for the attraction effect is that z is a weaker competitor than c and, therefore, that t is more
likely to be preferred in a binary comparison with z than in a binary comparison with c. If
pt,z increases, the similarity effect gets weaker and the attraction effect gets stronger.
3. Other choice procedures
Under procedure P , an asymmetrically dominated alternative is chosen with positive probabil-
ity. In experiments, between 1% and 4% of the subjects choose the asymmetrically dominated
alternative. Since the choice of a dominated alternative is clearly suboptimal, the question
arises which choice procedures ensure that dominated alternatives are never chosen. In exper-
iments, alternatives are usually described as vector of attributes. In this case, it is straightfor-
ward to identify the dominated alternative by comparing the strength of attributes and it is not
necessary to refer to preferences or choice probabilities. In this section, we consider situations
where subjects know that it is posssible that one alternative is asymmetrically dominated in
the sense that some other alternative is always ’better’ (i.e., for all preference relations) but
where there is no method to identify a dominated alternative without referring to preferences
or choice probabilities. Therefore, we use the term ’asymmetrically dominated’ for an alterna-
tive that is chosen with probability zero in a binary comparison with some other alternative
in S.
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We consider choice procedures that only rely on the results of binary comparisons to de-
termine the alternative that is chosen.
Definition: A choice procedure is finite if there exists h <∞ such that some alternative from
S is chosen after at most h binary comparisons.
Theorem 1: For n ≥ 3, there exists no finite choice procedure such that an asymmetrically
dominated alternative is chosen with probability zero.
To see the intuition behind Theorem 1, note that is not possible to prove that the choice
probability in a binary comparison is zero with a finite number of comparisons. Hence, it is not
possible to identify asymmetrically dominated alternatives with a finite number of comparisons.
But it is possible to identify alternatives that are not dominated. Hence the only way to ensure
that asymmetrically dominated alternatives are not chosen is via a choice procedure that puts
positive probability only on alternatives that have been preferred over all other alternatives
in some binary comparison. While it is possible to identify non-dominated alternatives with a
few comparisons, Theorem 1 shows that there exists no finite procedure that identifies at least
one non-dominated alternative with probability one. Of course, if the choice set S contains
only two alternatives, then any procedure that selects the alternative that is preferred in the
binary comparison ensures that a non-dominated alternative is chosen.
Let n = 3 and consider the following choice procedure P 0:
Procedure P’ :
Step 1: Draw two alternatives from S at random and compare them.
Step 2: Compare the preferred alternative to the alternative that was not part of the last
comparison.
Step 3: Repeat step 2. The first alternative that has been preferred over the other two
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alternatives is chosen.
If n = 2, then P 0 coincides with a binary comparison and the subject simply chooses
the preferred alternative. Procedure P 0 ensures that dominated alternatives are never chosen
since subjects choose the first alternative of which they know that it is not dominated. The
alternative that is chosen is also the alternative that won the most comparisons. Note that P 0
is not a finite choice procedure for n = 3. Hence for every h <∞, with positive probability no
alternative is chosen after h comparisons. For practical purposes, this is less problematic since
P 0 determines with high probability an alternative after a few comparisons. For example, if
the probability that an alternative is preferred in a binary comparison is 0.5, then on average,
it takes three comparisons to determine the alternative that is chosen.
Let PrP 0{i|i, j, k} be the probability that i is chosen from {i, j, k} under procedure P 0.
Proposition 2: PrP 0{i|i, j, k} = 13pi,jpi,k
h
1+pj,k(1+pk,i)
1−pk,ipj,kpi,j +
pj,i+2pk,j+pi,jpj,k
1−pj,ipk,jpi,k
i
.
To relate the results for procedure P 0 to the findings in section 2, we use the notation from
section 2. Hence t and c are the alternatives in the original choice set and t is the alternative
whose probability to be chosen is of interest. An asymmetrically dominated alternative is
denoted by d, a symmetrically dominated alternative by s, and z refers to an alternative that
is inferior to t but not dominated by t or c.
Corollary 5: (Asymmetric Dominance) Let 0 < pt,c < 1 and pc,d < 1. If pd,t = 0, then
PrP 0{t|t, c, d} > PrP 0{t|t, c} and PrP 0{d|t, c, d} = 0.
Corollary 6: (Symmetric Dominance) Let 0 < pt,c < 1. PrP 0{t|t, c, s} = PrP 0{t|t, c} and
PrP 0{c|t, c, s} = PrP 0{c|t, c} if and only if ps,t = ps,c = 0.
Corollary 7: (Attraction Effect) For every 0 < pt,c < 1 and 0 < pc,z < 1, there exist an
interval I such that PrP 0{t|t, c, z} > PrP 0{t|t, c} if and only if pt,z ∈ I.
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While P 0 is a different choice procedure, its qualitative results are the same as for proce-
dure P . Specifically, if an asymmetrically dominated alternative is added to the choice set,
the probability that the dominant alternative is chosen increases (Corollary 5) although the
asymmetrically dominated alternative is never chosen. Corollary 6 shows that the addition of
an alternative has no effect on choice probabilities if and only if the additional alternative is
dominated by both alternatives in the original choice set. Corollary 7 shows that the prob-
ability that an alternative is chosen can increase even if an alternative is added that is not
dominated but that is inferior to one of the alternatives in the original choice set. The fact
that the qualitative results under procedure P and P 0 are the same shows that the explanation
of asymmetric dominance and attraction effects does not rely on specific details of the choice
procedure but that these effects are a more general property of choice by binary comparisons.
There are two differences between choice procedures P and P 0: Since P 0 involves a larger
number of comparisons, it is a more complicated choice procedure but choices under P 0 are
more informed since dominated alternatives are never chosen. This suggests that procedure P is
more appropriate to describe choices among relatively unimportant alternatives (e.g., different
brands of canned beans) whereas procedure P 0 is more appropriate to describe choices among
important alternatives.
Procedure P 0 offers a formal model of why individuals sometimes compare the same al-
ternatives more than once. Alternatives are compared for a second (third, etc.) time if the
results from earlier comparisons are inconclusive because each alternative ’won’ a comparison
against one of the other alternatives and ’lost’ a comparison against another alternative. In
such a situation, there is no obvious choice and the only thing that the individual can do to
make an informed decision is to proceed with another round of comparisons. Hence procedure
P 0 implies that individuals sometimes revise their opinion and choose an alternative that was
not preferred in some earlier comparison.
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4. Marketing Implications
There exists plenty of empirical and experimental evidence that choices among three or more al-
ternatives can not be accurately described by standard choice models where individuals choose
the alternative that yields the highest utility. However, predicting choices and market shares is
crucial for firms. Our model allows to predict market shares and explains the observations of
the literature such as the asymmetric dominance, attraction, and similarity effects. The model
shows why firms can increase their sales if they introduce a new product even if this product
is rarely or never chosen. The model predicts the probability that an alternative is chosen
as function of the binary choice probabilities. For firms, it is not only important to predict
market shares for a given price of their product but also to determine the optimal price where
the price obviously affects market shares. If firms can assess how prices affect binary choice
probabilities, then the model can be used to compute market shares as function of the price
and, therefore, can be used to determine the profit maximizing price.
We discuss two additional implications for marketing and product design.
4.1. Ordering Effects and the Presentation of Alternatives
It is common that firms try to influence how and where their products are displayed. In the
context of this paper, how and where products are displayed is important because it is likely to
affect the order in which products are recognized and compared. As benchmark, we assume in
sections 2 and 3 that each alternative is with equal likelihood part of the first comparison. In
real choice situations, there exist various possibilities to influence the order in which products
are compared. For example, in a supermarket, two products can be placed on the same shelf
and one product on the shelf above or below. Similarly, since all customers approach the
check-out from the same direction, the order in which products are arranged on the same shelf
can be chosen to affect the order in which they are compared.
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Recall that P 0 is a more complicated choice procedure than P but that it leads to decisions
that are better informed. This suggests that P is the more appropriate description if subjects
choose among relatively unimportant items whereas P 0 is the more appropriate description for
important items. Consider procedure P . If there are three products and product i is part
of the first binary comparison, then it is chosen if it is preferred over each of the other two
products. However, if product i is not in first but only in the second comparison, then it is
chosen if it is preferred over one product (the one that ’wins’ the first comparison). Hence,
the probability that a product is chosen decreases in the probability that the product is part
of the first comparison. Choices under procedure P exhibit a recency effect in the sense that
an alternative is more likely to be chosen if it is presented later rather than earlier. The
recency effect occurs because subjects only consider the alternative that was preferred in the
last comparison when they make the next comparison. On the other hand, choices under
procedure P 0 exhibit a primacy effect as the probability that a product is chosen increases in
the probability that the product is part of the first comparison. The primacy effect occurs
because subjects try to avoid the mistake of choosing a dominated alternative. Therefore, they
choose the first alternative that is known to be not dominated which is equivalent to choosing
the first alternative that is preferred over both other alternatives.
To summarize the results, the model shows that ordering effects matter and that we should
expect to observe a recency effect if individuals choose among relatively unimportant items
and a primacy effect if individuals choose among important items. Of course, firms should take
these ordering effects into account and adjust the presentation of their products accordingly.
4.2. Product Design
Firms regularly redesign products to react to the products that are offered by competitors.
Consider a firm that faces two competitors j and k. For simplicity, suppose that there exist
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only two options to redesign product i. The first increases the probability that i is preferred
over j but has no effect on the probability that i is preferred over k. The second increases the
probability that i is preferred over k but has no effect on the probability that i is preferred
over j. Suppose that j is a stronger competitor than k in the sense that pjk > 0.5 and that
the probability that j is preferred over i is larger than the probability that k is preferred
over i. Note that procedure P and P 0 predict that the market share of j is larger than the
market share of k. The model shows that the firm should choose the first option to redesign
product i. Both under procedure P and P 0 a marginal increase of pi,j has a larger effect on
the probability that i is chosen than a marginal increase of pi,k. The reason is twofold. Since
pj,k > 0.5, product i is more likely to be compared to j than to k. And since pi,j < pi,k, a
marginal increase of pi,j raises the probability that i is preferred over j and k more that a
marginal increase of pi,k. Generally speaking, this implies that firms should orient the redesign
of their products towards the strongest competitor. An increase of the probability that one’s
product is preferred over the strong competitor leads to a larger increase of the market share
than an increase of the probability that one’s product is preferred over the weak competitor.
5. Conclusion
By now, there exists plenty of experimental and empirical evidence that context effects matter
and that choice patterns among more than two alternatives systematically violate the assump-
tion of regularity. In particular, the asymmetric dominance and the attraction effect show that
the probability that an alternative is chosen can increase if a new alternative is added to the
choice set. These observations challenge standard economic theory because they contradict
even the weakest rationality requirements in economic models. This poses difficulties for firms
when they try to predict how market shares change if new products are introduced.
Most explanations of the asymmetric dominance and the attraction effect that have been
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suggested in the literature concentrate on qualitative results and do not generate quantitative
predictions. These explanations relate the strength of attributes of different alternatives (es-
sentially: the utility that is derived from an attribute) to the probability that an alternative
is chosen. Context effects arise because new alternatives affect how individuals weight and
perceive attributes or because new alternatives make it easier to justify a decision.
We analyze a simple and intuitive model of procedural choice among several alternatives.
Individuals determine their choice by a sequence of binary comparisons between the alterna-
tives. The model generates quantitative predictions about choice patterns and how choices
change if alternatives are added or excluded. The model explains asymmetric dominance, at-
traction, and similarity effects in a simple unified framework. Our approach highlights a new
and fundamental aspect why the context of the choice situation affects choices. New alterna-
tives affect choices because they are compared to the other alternatives and because the result
of the comparisons determines which alternative is choosen.
Since the model is easy to apply and uses a simple probabilistic choice framework, it is
straightforward to use the model to analyze related questions such as marketing strategies or
product design. For example, the model explains why we observe recency and primacy effects
and shows how firms can benefit if they take these ordering effects into account. Another
application is product design. The model shows that firms which redesign their product should
orient the new design towards improving relative to the strongest competitor.
6. Appendix
Proof Proposition 1: If there exist n alternatives, then procedure P specifies n − 1 bi-
nary comparisons. With probability 2n is an alternative part of the first comparison. With
probability 1n it appears for the first time in comparison 2, 3, ..n− 1.
Therefore, with probability n−1n is i part of the first n−2 comparisons. Given that i is part
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of the first n− 2 comparisons, with probability 1n−1 is j not part of the first n− 2 comparisons
and appears only in the last comparison. Given that i is part of the first n − 2 comparisons
while j is not, the probability that i is chosen is Pr{i|S−j} · pij .
Alternative i appears with probability 1n only in the last comparison. Given that i appears
for the first time in the last comparison, the probability that j is the winning alternative after
n− 2 comparisons is Pr{j|S−i}. Hence 1n
P
j 6=i Pr{j|S−i} · pij is the probability that i appears
only in the last comparison and that i is chosen.
Hence Pr{i|S} = 1n
P
j 6=i Pr{i|S−j}·pij+ 1n
P
j 6=i Pr{j|S−i}·pij = 1n
P
j 6=i pij (Pr{i|S−j}+Pr{j|S−i})
Proof Corollary 1: With probability 23 , alternative t is part of the first comparison.
In this case t is chosen if it is preferred against c and d, i.e., with probability pt,cpt,d. With
probability 13 , the first comparison is between c and d. With probability pc,d, c is preferred
over d and t is chosen with probability pt,cpc,d. With probability 1− pc,d, d is preferred over c
and t is chosen with probability pt,d(1− pc,d).
Proof Corollary 2: If pt,d = 1, then Pr{t|c, t, d} = 23pt,c + 13 [pt,cpc,d + 1− pc,d]. By
assumption, pc,t, pc,d ∈ (0, 1). Hence 23pt,c +
1
3 [pt,cpc,d + 1− pc,d] > pt,c. Hence Pr{t|c, t, d} >
Pr{t|c, t}.
Proof Corollary 3: obvious
Proof Corollary 4: Recall that Pr{t|c, t, z} > Pr{t|c, t} if 23pt,cpt,z+13 [pt,cpc,z + pt,z(1− pc,z)] >
pt,c. Rearranging terms shows that Pr{t|c, t, d} > Pr{t|c, t} if pt,zpz,c2(1−pt,z)+pz,c > pt,c.
Proof Theorem 1:
We prove the Theorem for n = 3. The extension to n > 3 is straightforward (e.g., one can
always add alternatives that are dominated by the first three alternatives).
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If n = 3, then there are three binary comparisons possible. Let h1, h2, and h3 denote how
often i is compared to j, j is compared to k, and k is compared to i, with h1 + h2 + h3 = h
with h <∞. Wlog. suppose that pi,j > 0, that pj,k > 0, and that pk,i > 0. Hence it is possible
that j is dominated by i or that k is dominated by j or that i is dominated by k (i.e., it is
possible that pi,j = 1 or pj,k = 1 or pk,i = 1).
With probability pi,jh1pj,kh2pk,ih3 each alternative ’wins’ all comparisons against one of the
remaining alternatives and ’looses’ all comparisons against the other one. Since by assumption
pi,j ·pj,k ·pk,i > 0, with positive probability the choice procedure has to determine an alternative
after h comparisons when each alternative has ’won’ each comparisons against one of the
remaining alternatives and ’lost’ all comparisons against the other one. Hence, regardless
whether the choice procedure chooses i, j, or k, it is possible that the chosen alternative is
dominated by one of the other alternatives.
Note that the argument holds for all h1, h2, and h3 with h1+h2+h3 = h and h <∞. Hence,
the argument does not depend on the details of the choice procedure (that might specify the
order or frequency of comparisons as function of the outcomes of earlier comparisons). Hence
the argument applies to all finite choice procedures.
Proof Proposition 2: With probability 13 the first comparison is between i and j. The
probability that i is chosen given that the first comparison is between i and j is:
PrP 0{i|i, j, k}start i,j = pi,j|{z}
i-j
⎡
⎢⎣ pi,k|{z}
i-k
+ (1− pik)pj,kpi,j| {z }
i-k, k-j, j-i
⎡
⎢⎣ pi,k|{z}
i-k
+ (1− pik)pj,kpi,j| {z }
i-k, k-j, j-i
[...]
⎤
⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎦
+(1− pi,j)(1− pj,k)pi,k| {z }
i-j, j-k, k-i
⎡
⎢⎣ pi,j|{z}
i-j
+ (1− pi,j)(1− pj,k)pi,k| {z }
i-j, j-k, k-i
⎡
⎢⎣ pi,j|{z}
i-j
+ (1− pi,j)(1− pj,k)pi,k| {z }
i-j, j-k, k-i
[...]
⎤
⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎦
The first line of the equation is the probability that i is chosen if i is preferred over j in the
first comparison, the second line is the probability that i is chosen if j is preferred over i in the
first comparison. The letters under the horizontal curly brackets indicate which alternatives
are compared. Alternatives that are preferred are denoted in bold letters.
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Then PrP 0{i|i, j, k}start i,j = pi,jpi,k
£
1 + (1− pi,k)pj,kpi,j + ((1− pi,k)pj,kpi,j)2 + ...
¤
+pi,j
h
(1− pi,j)(1− pj,k)pi,k + ((1− pi,j)(1− pj,k)pi,k)2 + ...
i
Hence PrP 0{i|i, j, k}start i,j = pi,jpi,k1−(1−pi,k)pj,kpi,j + pi,j
(1−pi,j)(1−pj,k)pi,k
1−(1−pi,j)(1−pj,k)pi,k .
With probability 13 the first comparison is between i and k. The probability that i is chosen
given that the first comparison is between i and k is:
PrP 0{i|i, j, k}start i,k = pi,k [pi,j + (1− pi,j)(1− pj,k)pi,k [pi,j + (1− pi,j)(1− pj,k)pi,k [...]]]
+(1− pi,k)pj,kpi,j [pi,k + (1− pi,k)pj,kpi,j [pi,k + (1− pi,k)pj,kpi,j [...]]]
Hence PrP 0{i|i, j, k}start i,k = pi,kpi,j1−(1−pi,j)(1−pj,k)pi,k + pi,k
(1−pi,k)pj,kpi,j
1−(1−pi,k)pj,kpi,j .
With probability 13 the first comparison is between j and k. The probability that i is chosen
given that the first comparison is between j and k is:
PrP 0{i|i, j, k}start j,k = pj,kpi,j [pi,k + (1− pi,k)pj,kpi,j [pi,k + (1− pi,k)pj,kpi,j [...]]]
+(1− pj,k)pi,k [pi,j + (1− pi,j)(1− pj,k)pi,k [pi,j + (1− pi,j)(1− pj,k)pi,k [...]]]
Hence PrP 0{i|i, j, k}start j,k = pj,kpi,jpi,k1−(1−pi,k)pj,kpi,j + (1− pj,k)pi,k
pi,j
1−(1−pi,j)(1−pj,k)pi,k .
Then PrP 0{i|i, j, k} = 13 PrP 0{i|i, j, k}start i,j+13 PrP 0{i|i, j, k}start i,k+13 PrP 0{i|i, j, k}start j,k.
Since pj,k = 1− pk,j and similar for pi,k and pi,j we have
PrP 0{i|i, j, k} = 13pi,jpi,k
h
1+pj,k(1+pk,i)
1−pk,ipj,kpi,j +
pj,i+2pk,j+pi,jpj,k
1−pj,ipk,jpi,k
i
.
Proof Corollary 5: If pd,t = 0, then PrP 0{t|t, c, d} = 13pt,c
h
1 + pc,d +
pc,t+2pd,c+pt,cpc,d
1−pc,tpd,c
i
.
If pd,t = 0 and pc,d = 1, then PrP 0{t|t, c, d} = pt,c. Hence it is sufficient to show that 1+ pc,d+
pc,t+2pd,c+pt,cpc,d
1−pc,tpd,c is decreasing in pc,d.
Recall that pd,c = 1− pc,d and pc,t = 1− pt,c. Hence 1+ pc,d+ pc,t+2pd,c+pt,cpc,d1−pc,tpd,c = 1+ pc,d+
3−pt,c−2pc,d+pt,cpc,d
pt,c+pc,d−pt,cpc,d . Then
∂
∂pc,d
³
1 + pc,d +
3−pt,c−2pc,d+pt,cpc,d
pt,c+pc,d−pt,cpc,d
´
= 1 +
−3+2pt,c
(pt,c+pc,d−pt,cpc,d)2 .
Note that 2pt,c − 3 ≤ −1. Hence 1 + 2pt,c−3(pt,c+pc,d−pt,cpc,d)2 ≤ 1−
1
(pt,c+pc,d−pt,cpc,d)2 . Note that
pt,c + pc,d − pt,cpc,d < 1 except if pt,c = 1 and/or pc,d = 1. Since 0 < pt,c < 1 and pc,d < 1
we have 1 + 2pt,c−3
(pt,c+pc,d−pt,cpc,d)2 < 0. Hence 1 + pc,d +
pc,t+2pd,c+pt,cpc,d
1−pc,tpd,c is decreasing in pc,d and,
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therefore, pd,t = 0 implies that PrP 0{t|t, c, d} > pt,c for all pt,c, pc,d with 0 < pt,c < 1 and
pc,d < 1.
Proof Corollary 6: The ’if’ statement is obvious. With respect to the ’only if’ statement,
note that if ps,t > 0 and ps,c > 0, then s is chosen with positive probability and, therefore, it
can not be true that PrP 0{t|t, c, s} = PrP 0{t|t, c} and PrP 0{c|t, c, s} = PrP 0{c|t, c}. Consider
ps,t = 0 and ps,c > 0. Then Corollary 5 shows that PrP 0{t|t, c, s} > PrP 0{t|t, c}. The same
argument applies if ps,t > 0 and ps,c = 0.
Proof Corollary 7: From Corollary 5 follows that PrP 0{t|t, c, z} > pt,c if pt,z = 1 and
that PrP 0{t|t, c, z} < pt,c if pt,z = 0. Note that PrP 0{t|t, c, z} is continuous and increasing in
pt,z. Hence there exists  > 0 such that 13pt,c(1− )
h
1+pc,z+pc,z
1−pc,zpt,c +
3−pt,c−2pc,z+pt,cpc,z
1−(1−pt,c)(1−pc,z)(1−)
i
= pt,c.
Hence for all pt,z ∈ (1− , 1] we have PrP 0{t|t, c, z} > pt,c.
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